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Abstract  
 
 Substantial resources are being invested in health information exchanges (HIE), 
community-based consortia that enable independent health-care organizations to 
exchange clinical data. However, under pressure to form accountable care organizations, 
medical groups may merge and support private HIE, reducing the potential utility of 
community HIEs. Simulations of “care transitions” based on data from 10 Massachusetts 
communities suggest that mergers would have to be considerable to substantially reduce 
the potential utility of an HIE. Nonetheless, simulations also suggest that HIEs will need 
to recruit a large proportion of the medical groups in a community, as hospitals and the 
largest groups account for only 10 to 20% of care transitions in communities.  
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Introduction 
 Health information exchange may be on the verge of a major expansion. Almost 
two hundred organizations are operating or launching community health information 
exchanges (HIEs) to enable the exchange of data among healthcare organizations 
including independent healthcare providers. [1] Community HIEs have the potential to 
create substantial clinical and financial benefits as a return on the current investment of 
hundreds of millions of federal and state dollars. [2]  
 During the next few years, as community HIEs try to become established, the 
Affordable Care Act will encourage the formation of entities such as accountable care 
organizations (ACOs) that would integrate formerly independent hospitals and medical 
groups to form larger entities.  Presumably, these entities will support “private HIE.”  If 
the utility of community HIEs is based on their capacity to share patient data across 
hospitals and physician practices that are independent, the utility of community HIEs 
could diminish considerably as ACOs are formed, especially if many ACOs operate as 
closed systems.[3] Medical group mergers are already under way as hospitals and other 
entities purchase practices, and independent physicians are increasingly shifting toward 
employed status. [4] [5] The advent of ACOs may accelerate this trend, reducing the 
number of independent medical groups that would exchange data through a community 
HIE. [6] 
 At the same time, community HIEs will face another challenge: recruiting and 
retaining medical groups. [29] Like a telephone exchange, an HIE is only as good as its 
participating membership. Independent providers might decline to join an HIE for many 
reasons, such as concern over competition for patients, technical challenges, privacy and 
security concerns, legal issues, HIE-related fees, the lack of a business case, and they 
may not believe an HIE will have relevant information. [7] [8] [9] If few providers in a 
community contribute data to an HIE, the number of opportunities to use the HIE for 
improving the coordination and continuity of care will be greatly reduced, and the HIE’s 
potential utility will be diminished. 
 This study examines how two factors – (1) the consolidation of hospitals and 
medical groups into ACOs and (2) the degree of success of HIE recruitment efforts – 
affect the potential utility of community HIEs.  We simulated conditions of consolidation 
and recruitment using data from ten communities. To measure a community HIE’s 
potential utility, we used the proportion of relevant care transitions, which we identified 
from administrative claims data, that would be served by the HIE.  
 
Methods 
Overview 
 We used the number of care transitions in a community as a basis for measuring 
the potential utility of an HIE. A care transition is a sequential pair of patient encounters 
that involve two different provider groups in a community in which medical records are 
not shared so that a community HIE might be used to transmit clinical data between the 
two groups. Sequential visits to two different clinicians within a group were not included 
because exchange of data could be executed internally through a common medical record, 
without the need for an HIE.  
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To simulate the effects of consolidation of medical groups and hospitals and the 
effects of provider recruitment in an HIE, we analyzed ten geographically-defined 
communities that were either actively building an HIE or had applied within the past few 
years to receive a large grant for constructing a community-wide HIE. For each of these 
communities, we simulated various scenarios of medical group mergers and provider 
recruitment (described below), assessing the change in the proportion of care transitions 
that could be covered by an HIE under each scenario. 
Data Sources 
 We obtained administrative claims data for members of a major private insurer, 
which had a larger market share, in 10 geographical communities in Massachusetts. The 
data set included all claims, paid and unpaid, from January 1st 2005 through June 30th 
2009, which were submitted to the insurer by providers who practiced within the zip 
codes of the communities. We divided the data set into three 18-month periods to test for 
consistency of the results, and for each study period we included only patients enrolled 
for the duration of the study period. The data set also included demographic information 
about the providers from the end of the final study period, which we used to assign 
providers to medical groups (Appendix 1). We performed the entire analysis including all 
clinical specialties and also performed a separate analysis for only “core” provider 
specialties, those in which the providers were likely to be frequent HIE users. This core 
group included most physician specialties and nurses. We excluded radiologists and 
pathologists from the core specialties because those providers tend to have high volumes 
of care transitions which would dominate the simulation results and interfere with closer 
examination of data exchanges among the other specialties. 
Measuring Care Transitions 
 We used claims data to identify provider visits. Multiple claims with the same 
date, medical group and patient were considered part of the same visit. All claims that 
occurred during an inpatient visit were considered part of the one visit to an assigned 
hospital in the community. We excluded all claims labeled as facilities fees and any other 
claims not labeled “professional.” A care transition was identified based on the sequence 
of provider visits and was counted if the patient’s preceding medical visit was to a 
different medical group. Repeat visits to the same group without intervening visits to 
other providers were not counted as care transitions (Exhibit 1). This measure is similar 
to the “sequence” metric used by researchers to estimate continuity of care. [10] It is an 
estimate of the number of times that community providers would potentially access an 
aggregate longitudinal patient record stored within a community HIE. [3]  
 To estimate potential utility of the HIE, we computed the total number of patients’ 
care transitions between the medical groups which were assumed to be participating in 
the community HIE under each simulated scenario. For each of the ten communities, we 
computed the baseline number of care transitions by assuming that all included medical 
groups participated in their community HIE and none of them had merged. The specific 
simulation patterns generated for both medical group mergers and for provider 
recruitment are described below. 
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Simulations 
 We performed two simulations that generated scenarios of medical group mergers 
and two more simulations that generated scenarios of varied provider recruitment. 
 Simulation 1: Large group mergers. This simulation shows the cumulative impact 
of mergers among hospitals and the largest medical groups on the proportion of care 
transitions available to the HIE. After computing the baseline number of care transitions 
that occurred in one study period assuming full participation by community medical 
groups, this simulation then computes the number of care transitions that would be 
covered by the HIE if the two groups that share the most care transitions between them 
had merged. A merger of these two groups would reduce the number of care transitions 
covered by the HIE more than any other merger. The simulation then repeats until all of 
the groups have merged into one community-wide group with zero care transitions.  
 Simulation 2: Small group mergers. Simulation 2 examines the cumulative effect 
of mergers of smaller groups on the proportion of care transitions available to the HIE. 
Merged groups are selected by taking the group with the smallest number of visits in the 
data set and merging it with the group with which it shares the largest number of care 
transitions. Like simulation 1, this simulation repeats until all groups merge into one 
community-wide group. 
 Simulation 3: Recruitment. Simulation 3 assesses the effect of an increase in the 
participation of medical groups on the proportion of care transitions handled by the HIE. 
Starting with a single participating group, the number of care transitions covered by the 
HIE is zero and increases with each additional group. This simulation begins with the 
medical group that is involved in the most care transitions in the community and 
iteratively adds the group involved in the next most volume of care transitions until it 
reaches the baseline case of all groups participating. It therefore reflects one case of how 
HIEs may recruit medical groups. 
 Simulation 4: Retention. Simulation 4 assumes full community participation and 
then simulates the non-participation of only the group that is involved in the most care 
transitions in the community. Using the same sequence of groups as simulation 3, it then 
iteratively simulates the non-participation of the group involved in the next most volume 
of care transitions until none of the groups are remaining. This simulation shows how 
many “key” groups exist in each community without which the HIE’s potential utility 
would be substantially reduced. It is analogous to a targeted attack on a network in which 
the nodes that would reduce the network’s potential utility by the greatest degree are 
attacked and removed from the network on at a time. [11]  
 For each simulation, we only varied either the group structure (simulations 1 and 
2) or which groups participated in the HIE (simulations 3 and 4). The time period was 
kept constant for every scenario within each simulation. Holding the simulation time 
periods constant allows an examination of the effect of our two phenomena on potential 
HIE utility, but does not represent realistic merging and recruitment events which would 
occur over time. 
 We performed the four simulations on the claims data for each of the ten 
communities, separately for core providers and for all providers, and for each of the three 
study periods. We executed the simulations using MATLAB version 7.9.0 (R2009b) on a 
high performance computing cluster. 
Analysis 
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 For each community, we computed the number of study patients, total visits, 
visits per patient, and number of medical groups including hospitals and their emergency 
departments. Visits to the ED in which the patients were admitted to the hospitals were 
counted as part of the same visit. We also computed the transition percentage – defined as 
the proportion of total community visits for which the previous visit in the community 
was to a different medical group.[3] To calculate market concentration, we used the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which ranges from near 0 (many small firms) to 1 
(only one large firm). The HHI is computed by squaring the market share of each group 
in the community and then summing the resulting numbers. To represent the market share 
of each group, we used the number of patient visits to that group during the study period. 
 For each simulation, we computed specific metrics that summarize the results. We 
computed the median and range of results across the communities, and compared the 
results across the three study periods, for both core specialties and all specialties. We 
normalized the results based on the number of medical groups in each community, which 
we calculated as the number of groups that would account for 99% of community care 
transitions. This excluded the smallest groups because they would not have much of an 
impact on the potential utility of the HIE. 
 In each community, we also examined the potential utility of the key hospitals or 
medical groups – defined as those that were involved in the most community care 
transitions – by reporting the potential utility of the HIEs when only those providers were 
participating compared to how much they would reduce the HIE’s potential utility if they 
were the only groups that did not participate.   
 
Results  
Community characteristics 
 The communities varied widely along several characteristics (Exhibit 2). There 
was a five-fold variation in the number of study patients per community, and an eight-
fold variation in the number of medical groups per community. The number of visits per 
patient to core providers ranged between 3.6 and 6.1. The transition percentage (the 
percentage of sequential encounters that involved distinct providers) also varied 
substantially across the study communities ranging from approximately 30% to 50% for 
core providers. The concentration of encounters among providers differed by a factor of 
more than 6 among the communities for core specialties. The community with the fewest 
patients (community number 10; Exhibit 2) was also the most concentrated by a 
substantial degree. 
Simulation results  
 The ten communities showed modest variation in their potential utility under the 
simulation scenarios we used (Exhibit 3). The results and analysis of the three study 
periods and for all provider specialties is available in Appendix 2. In all communities, 
simulation 1 results show that the potential utility of HIEs is not greatly affected by large 
group mergers: for core specialties the number of groups could be reduced by 20% to 
36% through the most high-impact mergers (via 6 to 41 mergers) before potential utility 
would be reduced below 50% (Exhibit 4). Under the pattern of consolidation in 
simulation 2 in which smaller groups merged into larger ones, as long as there were 
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between 4 and 9 groups remaining (3 to13% of the number of original groups), an HIE 
would still have 50% of its potential utility (Exhibit 5). 
 The provider recruitment simulation showed that a substantial number of groups 
would need to be recruited for an HIE to have substantial potential utility: to achieve 50% 
of the HIE’s potential utility, a median of 18.5 groups (ranging 6 to 35 or 18% to 36%) of 
total community medical groups would need to participate (Exhibit 6). Conversely, the 
HIE would be limited to 50% of its potential if it failed to retain a relatively small 
number of key groups, 2 to 10 groups which consist of 5% to 13% of the total community 
medical groups (Exhibit 7). If these 2 to 10 key groups were the only groups recruited, 
the HIE would realize only 10 to 20% of its potential utility (Exhibit 8). The communities 
would have to recruit approximately 2 and 4 times the number of these key groups to 
achieve 50% of their potential utility. 
 
Discussion 
 We simulated the impact of medical group consolidation and varying degrees of 
success in provider recruitment in HIEs on the potential utility of HIEs in ten 
geographically-defined communities. Our results suggest that with the exception of 
communities in which providers are highly concentrated, mergers of medical groups into 
ACOs would not substantially reduce the potential utility of community HIEs. 
Furthermore, considerable consolidation of smaller providers could occur without 
diminishing the HIE’s potential utility substantially. However, our results also suggest 
that participation by hospitals and other key medical groups may not be sufficient for 
HIEs to achieve their potential utility. It appears that these key providers are involved in 
many care transitions with other medical groups in the community but relatively few care 
transitions with one another.  
 Few other studies examine the potential utility of HIE by investigating patient 
patterns of encounters, and those have been limited mainly to emergency or acute care 
facilities.[12] [13] [14] Other studies have investigated care fragmentation by counting 
the number of different providers that patients visit in a given year and how providers are 
linked to other providers via shared patients. [15] [16] [17] However, these studies do not 
consider care transitions, an important additional dimension for estimating potential 
utility of HIEs.  
 Even though the ten study communities were located in Massachusetts, the 
communities’ characteristics differed notably, suggesting they may represent at least 
some of the diversity found in other parts of the U.S. For example, the number of visits 
per patient varied nearly 2-fold, which may reflect differences in patient visit patterns and 
crossover with providers in neighboring communities. Also, the transition percentage 
varied substantially across the communities. These variations may reflect differences in 
group structure, provider specialties, patient visit patterns, or differences in other patient 
or provider characteristics among the communities. The market concentration also varied 
considerably.  
 The findings in this study may be relevant to some of the key issues facing HIEs 
today, including working with accountable care organizations, recruiting a critical mass 
of providers, and paying for HIE services. 
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Accountable Care Organizations 
 While our study shows that an HIE may still be important even if there are many 
mergers, ACOs may create incentives for enough mergers in some communities to 
challenge the utility of an HIE because of a decrease in antitrust restrictions and because 
larger groups may be more efficient in delivering higher quality care. [18] On the other 
hand, some providers may want to have control of their patients’ data should they 
decided to leave an ACO, and a merger in which providers adopt the same EHR would 
not allow that kind of flexibility.[19] It is therefore unknown at this point if medical 
groups will merge and adopt shared EHRs on a scale that would pose a substantial threat 
to the utility of HIEs.  
 How ACOs and HIEs will be structured is also unknown. [6] [20] [21] Some 
communities may have one community-wide ACO whose medical groups all participate 
in the same private HIE; other communities may have multiple ACOs which share the 
same community HIE even for their internal data exchanges; [19] and others may involve 
more complex arrangements in which individual medical groups participate in multiple 
ACOs or multiple HIEs. Regardless, in many communities, ACOs and HIEs will need to 
work together to achieve their goals of improving care quality and reducing cost. 
 ACOs and HIEs with high rates of “leakage” or “crossover” of patient visits with 
neighboring communities may have difficulty determining which collection of medical 
groups would optimize their ability to coordinate care effectively and maximize HIE 
utility. Because regulations will not restrict Medicare patients from seeking care outside 
of an ACO, patient crossover may not be reduced in the near future. [20] However, there 
may be significant advantages for patients if they stay within the same HIE or ACO, such 
as improved coordination of care, and better measurements of provider quality. HIEs, 
ACOs, and policymakers should consider how to motivate patients to stay within their 
participating medical groups, perhaps through tiered copayments. [22]   
 Even so, there will likely always be a need for ACOs or HIEs to share data with 
external providers. In communities in which one ACO with a private HIE dominates, the 
ACO may attempt to “lock in” patients by restricting clinical exchange to only their 
providers, even if many patients receive care externally. This may be especially true for 
early-stage ACOs, which are still paid primarily using a fee-for-service model. Policies 
must ensure that ACOs share data with other ACOs as appropriate. This may be less of a 
concern for later stage ACOs whose payment depends heavily on quality measures and, 
therefore, have an incentive to share data if it would improve care quality. 
Critical mass of providers 
 Many HIEs begin with only a few large hospitals and large provider groups. [23] 
[9] [14] [24] Small practices have been slow to participate. [25] Our results suggest that 
hospitals and other larger medical groups are key, but they may not constitute a critical 
mass for many communities. Therefore, HIEs will need to recruit many smaller providers 
to realize most of their potential utility. [26]  
 To help with recruitment, incentives and workflow interventions may need to be 
customized to different kinds of providers. Hospitals and larger groups may be more 
worried about sharing data with competitors, and may therefore be a particularly good 
target for either strong incentives and/or close monitoring that data are actually being 
contributed. [7] [8] The barriers for smaller groups, by contrast, may relate different 
factors such as lack of technical expertise and they may need considerable technical 
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support. [27] Many medical groups will likely require training in how to integrate the 
HIE into their workflows. [28] [29] Meaningful use payments may accelerate HIE 
adoption for many medical groups, but they may be more effective for some types of 
groups than others. [30] [31] 
Who should pay for HIE?  
 If HIE can be shown empirically to reduced costs or improve quality, payers may 
create incentives that encourage the medical groups with whom they contract to 
participate in HIEs. [2] An analysis of the effect of each group’s participation on 
potential HIE utility, similar to what we do in the recruitment and retention simulations 
(simulations 3 and 4), could help inform the payment rates with empirical justification 
and provide a better estimate of value compared with a flat fee per physician. [32] To 
avoid free-riding among payers, all the major payers in a community may need to 
coordinate to perform this kind of analysis, perhaps via a third party, so that HIE payment 
rates are fairly distributed among the payers. This kind of differential fee schedule may 
be especially important for communities that contain large medical groups that provide 
comprehensive care for many patients (e.g. Kaiser Permanente) because they may 
employ many physicians but have relatively little need for HIE because of their patients’ 
visit patterns. 
 As HIE technology improves, providers may be more willing to pay for HIEs 
themselves, especially if they find HIEs save them time and helps them deliver better 
care, which may improve their chances of receiving payments based on quality measures. 
Providers may then have an interest in adopting a differential fee schedule for HIE 
instead of payers. Estimates of potential utility of HIE based on care transitions may be 
more effective as the basis of payment compared with requiring providers to pay for each 
HIE access because that would involve a disincentive for accessing the HIE. 
Limitations 
 This study was limited to patients younger than 65 years who were continuously 
enrolled with one private payer, and to providers with office addresses within ten 
communities in Massachusetts. None of the communities included a major urban center. 
The payer’s market penetration may have varied across the communities, thereby limiting 
the comparability of the communities. We did not verify the provider assignments to their 
medical groups, and we assumed all providers stayed in the same groups for all three 
study periods. The method we used to assign providers to groups may have overestimated 
medical group fragmentation by separating those clinicians who share an EHR but reside 
in different suites or addresses, or underestimated fragmentation by combining those 
clinicians who reside in the same suite or address but use separate EHRs. We likely 
overestimated the number of medical groups in each community because many providers 
had few visits. Potential utility as estimated by care transitions may be very different 
from actual utility because providers may not use an HIE for every care transition. We 
did not stratify types of care transitions by utility or value because we could find any 
studies that created such a stratification. However, some types of data exchange are 
clearly more important than others. Our study is also limited to the aggregate patient 
record form on HIE; we did not model other forms of HIE, such as point-to-point data 
exchange between medical groups. [33]  
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 Finally, for all simulations, we used the total care transitions which occurred in 
the community as the denominator for estimated potential utility. However, HIEs may 
also be interested in maximizing the percentage of care transitions covered by the HIE for 
only participating providers or using other metrics to evaluate their success. 
Conclusions 
 In this early study of the care transitions and potential utility of community HIEs, 
we analyzed visit patterns of patients enrolled with one private payer. Our findings 
suggest that, for many communities, mergers between medical groups will not threaten 
HIE’s potential utility unless many of them occur. Therefore it would be prudent to 
continue to invest in HIEs. However, our results also suggest that while most 
communities contain a few key medical groups that would be critical participants in an 
HIE, they would likely not be sufficient to achieve most of the HIE’s potential utility in 
the community. Additional incentives – carrots or sticks – may be necessary to ensure 
that enough groups participate in HIEs for them to realize their potential.  
 This study demonstrates that an analysis of patient visit patterns can provide 
important insights into the utility of HIEs. Individual HIEs may benefit from performing 
similar analyses as they grapple with issues related to working with ACOs, provider 
recruitment, and financial sustainability.   
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One patient’s visit sequence 
to medical groups A, B and C 
Baseline no. of care 
transitions  
No. care transitions 
covered by HIE if 
groups A and B 
merged  
No. care transitions 
covered by HIE if 
group C was not 
participating 
AAAAAAAAAA 0 0 0 
ABABABABAB 9 0 9 
AAAAABBBBB 1 0 1 
ABCAACABBA 7 4 4 
 
Exhibit 1. Example patient visit sequences and corresponding number of care transitions covered by an HIE.  
Source: Authors. 
Notes: Care transitions are opportunities for participating providers to access new data in the aggregate patient records of a community 
HIE. 
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Community2 No. patients No. visits3 Visits/patient No. transitions Transition percentage4 HHI 
No. 
groups 
1 51,434 295,460 5.74 138,114 46.75% 0.0225 182 
2 19,436 88,470 4.55 29,817 33.70% 0.0329 72 
3 46,911 191,828 4.09 70,662 36.84% 0.0372 107 
4 20,538 126,028 6.14 63,139 50.10% 0.0394 62 
5 49,040 217,304 4.43 76,680 35.29% 0.0401 101 
6 56,799 225,887 3.98 81,857 36.24% 0.0405 105 
7 40,001 144,048 3.60 45,273 31.43% 0.0409 76 
8 17,896 70,856 3.96 30,783 43.44% 0.0453 38 
9 16,740 75,678 4.52 22,532 29.77% 0.0715 34 
10 9,856 54,395 5.52 23,596 43.38% 0.1421 22 
median[min-
max] 
30,269.5[9,856-
56,799] 
135,038.[54,395-
295,460] 
4.48[3.60-
6.14] 
54,206.[22,532-
138,114] 
36.54%[29.77%-
50.10%] 
0.0403[0.0225-
0.1421] 
74[22-
182] 
 
Exhibit 2. Community characteristics table (core specialties only).1 
Source: Simulation of care transitions in ten Massachusetts communities. 
Notes:  
1. Includes visits to core specialties from patients who were fully enrolled with one private payer from January 1st 2005 until June 
30th 2006. 
2. Communities are presented here in order of increasing Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
3. Excludes each patient's initial visit in the study period because there is no way to determine if that visit involved a care transition.  
4. Transition percentage is defined as the percent of total visits to community providers for which the patient's previous visit was to a 
different medical group in the community. 
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  Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 
Community1 No. groups2 
No. big 
mergers 
which 
would 
reduce 
potential 
HIE usage 
by > 25%3 
No. big 
mergers 
which 
would 
reduce 
potential 
HIE usage 
by > 
50%3 
No. 
consolidated 
groups 
needed for 
potential 
HIE to be > 
30%4 
No. 
consolidated 
groups 
needed for 
potential 
HIE to be > 
50%4 
No. groups 
needed to 
participate 
to achieve 
15% 
potential 
HIE usage5,6 
No. groups 
needed to 
participate 
to achieve 
50% 
potential 
HIE usage5,6 
Reduction in 
potential HIE 
usage from 
absence of 2 
groups5,6 
Reduction in 
potential HIE 
usage from 
absence of 5 
groups5,6 
No. 
group 
absences 
which 
would 
reduce 
potential 
HIE 
usage 
by > 
50%5,6 
1 182 18 41 4 7 8 35 17.66% 34.27% 10 
2 72 12 24 4 9 7 23 28.01% 46.51% 7 
3 107 12 25 4 7 7 23 23.37% 41.32% 8 
4 62 8 17 2 4 5 15 29.43% 52.51% 5 
5 101 10 23 4 7 6 22 25.41% 43.09% 7 
6 105 10 22 3 5 6 20 25.12% 46.60% 6 
7 76 9 18 6 8 6 17 27.92% 50.81% 5 
8 38 8 14 4 7 6 13 30.12% 51.70% 5 
9 34 7 13 3 6 5 13 37.12% 62.36% 3 
10 22 2 6 2 4 2 6 63.52% 82.35% 2 
median[min-
max] 74[22-182] 9.5[2-18] 20.[6-41] 4.[2-6] 7.[4-9] 6.[2-8] 18.5[6-35] 
27.97%[17.66%-
63.52%] 
48.70%[34.27%-
82.35%] 
5.5[2-
10] 
 
Exhibit 3. Summary results (core specialties only from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2006) 
Source: Simulation of care transitions in ten Massachusetts communities. 
Notes:  
1. Communities are presented here in order of increasing Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
2. No. groups are those that constitute 99% of community care transitions. 
3. The sequence of mergers was decreasing by number care transitions between the pairs of medical groups in each geographic 
community. 
4. Consolidation was simulated by iteratively merging groups that had the smallest visit volumes into the groups with which they 
shared the most care transitions. 
5. The sequence of the groups is decreasing by volume of care transitions in each geographic community. 
6. The denominator for these percentages is the potential HIE usage for the study period in each community assuming complete 
participation and no mergers i.e. the total number of care transitions between groups during the study period.   
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Exhibit 4. Larger mergers (simulation 1, for core specialties only).  
Source: Simulation of care transitions in ten Massachusetts communities. 
Notes:  
This pattern simulates the effect of mergers of medical groups on the potential utility of community HIEs. Groups are chosen to merge 
based on the pairs of groups with the most care transitions between them and so the first merger has the largest effect. The data 
include only core specialties and patient visits from January 1st 2005 through June 30th 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived 
pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not represent time. Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire 
the study period.) 
 17 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100%
Percent of Community Medical Groups that have Merged
Pe
rc
en
t o
f t
ot
al
 c
ar
e 
tr
an
si
tio
ns
 in
 e
ac
h 
co
m
m
un
ity
Community 1
Community 2
Community 3
Community 4
Community 5
Community 6
Community 7
Community 8
Community 9
Community 10
 
 
Exhibit 5. Small mergers (simulation 2, for core specialties only).  
Source: Simulation of care transitions in ten Massachusetts communities. 
Notes:  
This pattern simulates the effect of mergers of medical groups on the potential utility of community HIEs. Groups with the smallest 
visit volumes are chosen to merge with the group with whom they share the most care transitions and so the first mergers tend to have 
small effects. The data include only core specialties and patient visits from January 1st 2005 through June 30th 2006. (Note: The x-
axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not represent time. Every data point simulates all 
patient visits for the entire the study period.) 
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Exhibit 6. Recruitment (simulation 3, for core specialties only).  
Source: Simulation of care transitions in ten Massachusetts communities. 
Notes:  
This pattern simulates the effect of medical group participation in community HIEs on the potential utility of the HIEs beginning with 
one group participating. The sequence of groups is determined by decreasing volume of care transitions in each community. The data 
include only core specialties and patient visits from January 1st 2005 through June 30th 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived 
pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not represent time. Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire 
the study period.) 
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Exhibit 7. Retention (simulation 4, for core specialties only).  
Source: Simulation of care transitions in ten Massachusetts communities. 
Notes:  
This pattern simulates the effect of the absence of medical groups from community HIEs on the potential utility of the HIEs beginning 
with full participation. The sequence of groups is determined by decreasing volume of care transitions in each community and so the 
first group has the largest effect.  The data include only core specialties and patient visits from January 1st 2005 through June 30th 
2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not represent time. Every data 
point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.) 
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Community No. key groups1 
Percent of total groups 
that are key groups2 Key group descriptions
3 
HIE potential 
utility with key 
groups only 
(simulation 3) 
Decrease in potential 
utility of HIE if key 
groups do not 
participate 
(simulation 4)4 
1 10 5.49% 
Hospital, Multispecialty, Multispecialty, 
Dermatology, Orthopedic Surgery, 
Multispecialty, Multispecialty, Primary care & 
Pediatrics, Hospital, Otolaryngology 
19.71% 50.42% 
2 7 9.72% 
Hospital, Primary care, Multispecialty, Primary 
care, Cardiovascular Disease, Primary care, 
Pediatrics 
16.63% 53.35% 
3 8 7.48% 
Hospital, Multispecialty, Multispecialty, 
Orthopedic surgery, Obstetrics &  Gynecology, 
Pediatrics, Primary care, Orthopedic Surgery 
20.16% 53.02% 
4 5 8.06% 
Hospital, Primary care, Primary care, 
Ophthalmology, Obstetrics & Gynecology 18.54% 52.51% 
5 7 6.93% 
Multispecialty, Hospital, Primary care, Hospital, 
Multispecialty, Primary care, Primary care 17.75% 53.61% 
6 6 5.71% 
Multispecialty, Hospital, Multispecialty, 
Multispecialty, Primary care, Orthopedic Surgery 15.11% 51.00% 
7 5 6.58% 
Hospital, Dermatology, Multispecialty, 
Orthopedic Surgery, Multispecialty 13.11% 50.81% 
8 5 13.16% 
Hospital, Primary care & Pediatrics, Primary 
care, Primary care, Orthopedic Surgery 13.85% 51.70% 
9 3 8.82% Multispecialty, Hospital, Multispecialty 10.67% 50.36% 
10 2 9.09% Multispecialty, Hospital 20.85% 63.52% 
median[min-
max] 5.5[2-10] 7.77%[5.49%-13.16%] N/A 
17.19%[10.67%-
20.85%] 
52.11%[50.36%-
63.52%] 
 
Exhibit 8. Key medical groups (core specialties only, for visits from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2006).  
Source: Simulation of care transitions in ten Massachusetts communities. 
Notes: 
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1. Key groups are those involved in the most care transitions in the community and would limit HIE potential utility to <50% of 
potential if they did not participate. 
2. Total groups are those that constitute 99% of community care transitions. 
3. The group descriptions are ordered from those involved in the most community care transitions to the least.  
4. Assumes all non-key groups participate in HIE.
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Appendix 1: Methodology Details 
 
Designating medical groups 
 
We designated provider numbers in the data set who were listed at the same address as 
part of the same group. For provider numbers listed at the same address, in a large office 
building for example, we used the follow steps to designate groups:  
 
1. Put provider numbers which share the same suite number into the same group. 
(Some providers do not have a suite number.) 
2. Of the groups formed in step 1, merge together any groups that have provider 
numbers with the same listed practice name. (Some providers do not have a 
listed practice name.) 
3. For the remaining provider numbers without listed suite numbers but who do have 
listed practice names: 
a. Merge the provider number into an already formed group that has the 
same listed practice name.  
b. Put the remaining provider numbers into groups who share the same listed 
practice name. 
4. For the remaining provider numbers without any listed suite or practice name: 
a. Merge the provider number with the already formed group that has the 
most provider numbers of their same specialty. (Often there is only one 
option.) 
b. Merge the remaining provider numbers with the already formed group that 
has the most provider numbers in the same specialty category, as defined 
below 
c. Form new groups of the remaining provider numbers by grouping 
specialties according to their same specialty categories. 
d. For hospital addresses, assign radiologists, pathologists and 
anesthesiologists to the hospital even if they had another group listed  
 
Specialty categories:  
1. Ophthalmology, Optometry 
2. Clinical Nurse Specialist, LICSW, Psychiatry, Psychology (Note: Clinical Nurse 
Specialist is also included in category 6) 
3. Dentistry, Endontics, Periodontics, Oral surgery 
4. Anesthesiology, Chiropractic, Neurology, Occupational Therapy, Orthopedics, 
Physical Therapy Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, Podiatry 
5. Audiology, Otolaryngologist 
6. All other core specialties and Dietary Nutritionist 
7. All other non-core specialties 
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Assigning visits to medical groups 
All included claims that were listed as occurring in an office-based facility were assigned 
to the group to which the provider number was assigned as per the method above. 
Multiple claims ascribed to the same patient and provider number for the same date were 
considered part of the same visit.  
Claims that were listed as occurring in an inpatient facility as well as all emergency 
claims (as indicated by CPT codes) were considered as part of the same hospital visit if 
they contained overlapping visit dates. These hospital visits were assigned to a 
community hospital in our analysis if one or more claim involved with the visit was 
ascribed to a provider number associated with that hospital. If an inpatient visit did not 
involved any claim associated with a community hospital, the visit was excluded because 
the visit may have occurred at a hospital outside of the community. If an inpatient visit 
involved claims associated with more than one community hospital, the visit was 
excluded because we were unable to determine at which hospital the visit occurred. To 
locate the major hospitals in each community, we used Google.  
 
 
Exclusions 
 
We excluded: all claims assigned to facilities and other claims not labeled “professional”; 
providers with addresses listed at P.O. boxes; and provider addresses with fewer than 5 
claims total in the three 18-month study periods. 
 
We also excluded the following provider specialties: 
 
Ambulatory Surgi-Center 
Clinical Lab Participant 
Coordinated Home Health Care 
Detox facility 
DME home med equipment/respiratory 
Free-standing ambulance 
Heading Aid Vendor 
Home health care 
Home Infusion 
Independent Physiological and 
Diagnostics Lab 
Individual Case Management 
Pharmacy (participation) 
Physiological Lab 
Sleep testing facility 
Surgical day care center 
Community health center  
 
Core specialties 
We designated the provider numbers that were listed with the following specialties as 
“core” and only used claims assigned to those numbers in the portion of our analysis 
focused on core providers:  
 
Allergy & Immunology 
Anesthesiology 
Anesthetist (certified registered nurse) 
Cardiovascular Disease 
Cardio-thoracic Surgery 
Certified Nurse Midwife 
Clinical Nurse Specialist 
Colon & Rectal Surgery 
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Dermatology 
Emergency Medicine 
Endocrinology 
Family Practice 
Gastroenterology 
General Practice 
General Surgery 
Geriatric 
Gynecological Oncology 
Hand Surgery 
Hematology/Oncology 
Hospital Based Anesthesiologists 
Infectious Diseases 
Internal Medicine 
IVF 
Maternal & Fetal Medicine 
Nephrology 
Neurology 
Neurological Surgery 
Neonatal/Perinatal Medicine 
Nurse Practitioner 
Obstetrics & Gynecology 
Ophthalmology 
Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery 
Orthopedic Surgery 
Otolaryngology 
Pediatrics and all pediatric sub-
specialties 
Physician Assistant 
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation 
Plastic surgery 
Pulmonary Disease 
Psychiatry 
Psychopharmacology 
Reproductive Endocrinology 
Rheumatology 
Therapeutic Radiology 
Urology 
Vascular Surgery 
 
Non-core specialties 
 
We designated the provider numbers that were listed with the following specialties as 
“non-core” and only used claims assigned to those numbers in the portion of our analysis 
in which we included all providers (core and non-core):  
 
Acute Care Hosp/Diagnostic Imaging 
Anatomoc/Clinical Pathology 
Audiologist 
Chiropractic 
Chronic disease hospital 
Clinical Psychology 
Diagnostic imaging 
Diagnostic Radiology 
Dietary Nutritionist 
Early intervention 
Endodontics 
General Dentistry 
Hematologic Pathology 
Hospital Based Pathologists 
Hospital Based Radiologists 
Hospital (VA)  
Hospice 
Licensed Mental Health Counselor 
LICSW 
Multispecialty  
Neuropathology 
Occupational Therapists 
Optometry 
Orthodontics 
Periodontics 
Physical Therapy  
Podiatry 
Prosthodontics 
Radiology 
Speech Therapists 
 
